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Rethinking Church and
State
America’s Neutrality-Obsessed Separation, Its
Formation, Its Compromised State, and the
Way Forward
Benjamin Giles

R

eligion has long been a part of political and otherwise public
life, usually in union with political power. This relationship has
yielded great benefits for mankind, but it has also produced
civil strife, religious warfare, and other harms. By the time of the
American Founding, a new way of approaching this relationship
emerged, one that sought to keep religious and political power
separate. This paradigm became ingrained in the American
consciousness and the federal Constitution after independence, but
not the state law or American jurisprudence, at least until much later.
Church-state separation was gradually integrated into these
institutions over time, where it eventually interacted with liberal
constitutional principles that seek to keep the government and
Constitution neutral among ends. As a result, America now has a far
different conception of church and state separation, where church and
state are construed as two separate spheres that must not mix.
Neutrality-obsessed church-state separation, as I will call this new
conception, represents a fall from grace when compared to the
Founders’ separation and the separation I will advocate later. The first
part of this paper traces those changes in American thinking on
church-state separation that have led to its corruption.
After discussing how America has arrived, this paper will outline the
challenges, particularly from the Religious Right, that neutralityXJUR Vol. 4 (2016)
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obsessed church-state separation faces that render it unable to
function properly before proceeding by outlining the need for a
church-state relationship of some form.
Finally, this paper lays out a framework of principles for building a
church-state relationship: a tension between democratic inclusion and
freedom of religious conscience. The current balance, as this paper
will argue, too greatly favors democratic inclusion, and so the scales
must be moved to give greater favor to freedom of religious exercise.
I. The Gradual Formation of America’s Neutrality-Obsessed
Church-State Separation
The mere concept of separation between secular authority and
religious authority is clearly a modern phenomenon, since such a
separation would have been unthinkable for much of world history.
Edel describes ancient thinking on church and state:
As tribes grew into nations and more complex political and
religious organizations evolved, the distinction between
political and religious decision making sharpened. For
thousands of years, however, these two processes went hand
in hand, with little thought given to the separation of church
and state. On the contrary, any suggestion that the two be
divorced would have been considered both heretical and
treasonable: heretical in its challenge to established religious
doctrine; and treasonous in its challenge to the authority of
the ruler, whose position was based on the will of the god or
gods that he and his people worshipped.1
The state of affairs Edel describes prevailed in much of Europe and
western thought for centuries, with an assortment of related problems.
For example, England after the split with the Roman Church saw the
monarch placed at the head of the new Church of England, a fusion of
religious and secular power that persists to this day. When James II, a
Catholic, took the English throne in 1685, tension arose that resulted
1

Wilbur Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim
Fathers to Ronald Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1987), 3.
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in the Glorious Revolution, which deposed James II and placed
William III, a Dutchman, on the throne. The Revolution might have
been avoided had the union of English church and state not occurred.
Since the English settled their North American colonies during this
time of post-Henry VIII union of church and state, they carried a
similar model to the New World, at least until the English Civil War.
The colonies formed before the English Civil War followed a model
of union between secular and religious power that mirrored the
English. Within England itself: three religious groups dominated
(with one officially sanctioned church): Anglicans, Puritans, and
Catholics. Hutson argues that these three groups ultimately shared a
similar vision for religion and its relationship to the state: “All
believed that the state must assist the orthodox church in its
jurisdiction, promoting its doctrines and suppressing dissent from
them by force, if necessary.2” As these groups began to colonize the
eastern coast of North America, they took these principles with them.
The Church of England was the official church in colonial Virginia,3
and the Puritans built their own quasi-utopian society in
Massachusetts. In these and other early colonies, the modus operandi
was to unify religious and secular power under an established church.
That model for colonization changed with the English Civil War, after
which a new emphasis on pluralism and religious toleration emerged.
Colonies established after the War possessed a greater degree of
religious freedom than the older colonies. Among these new colonies
was Pennsylvania, which became known for its successful use of
religious pluralism. It was these colonies that could later provide a
blueprint for the Founders of how religious pluralism could work in a
society. 4
The dual approach in the colonies created a landscape of church and
state relations that was by no means uniform, and, in states with
2

James H. Hutson, Church and State in America: The First Two Centuries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2.
3
Ibid., 12–13.
4
Ibid., 30–31, 38.
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official churches, contradicted both the thinking of the Founders
towards church-state separation and modern neutrality-obsessed
separation. Hutson describes the diverse landscape:
The religious map of the colonies in 1689 [the founding date
of the last of the thirteen colonies] resembled Joseph’s coat
with its multiple hues and colors. In some colonies the state
compelled obedience to one official church; in others it was
stripped of all power over citizen’s consciences. There were
colonies in which religion was regulated in some places but
not in others. And there were colonies in which the brand of
religion supported by the state refrained from regulating
religion but signaled its intention to do so in the future.5
It was within this framework that the colonies functioned into the
eighteenth century, and it was within this framework that the
Founders and early American leaders were raised.
The Founders, chief among them Jefferson, supported a positive role
for religion in democratic society, but were nonetheless concerned
with limiting religion to keep both it and the state free of corruption.
Reichley argues that religion was primarily appreciated for its role in
developing citizens: “Almost all of the principal founders of the
United States, including Thomas Jefferson, were convinced that the
health of republican government depends on moral values derived
from religion.6” Ragosta adds that for Jefferson, “the contribution of
religion … to the ‘legitimate objects of society’ should not be missed.
This was a view of long standing with Jefferson and a belief broadly
shared in early America.7” There is no doubt that the Founders saw
religion as integral to the republic’s success, yet they also had a clear
sense that religion would depart from its beneficial role without a
separation of church and state. Ragosta summarizes Jefferson’s
5

Ibid., 1.
A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), 340.
7
John Ragosta, “Thomas Jefferson’s Religion and Religious Liberty,” in
Religious Freedom: Jefferson’s Legacy, America’s Creed (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2013), 16.
6
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thoughts on the matter: “He was convinced that any alliance between
church and state would prostitute both and undermine the noble
republican experiment, and it is clear that his concern went to both
government interference with religion and religion’s interference with
government.8” Ragosta continues: “Critically, for Jefferson, both true
religion and the republic depended upon liberty of the mind, including
full religious liberty. Of necessity, such liberty included separation of
church and state.9”
An immediate objection may be raised that if Jefferson argued for a
separation of church and state, then he would be a hypocrite to
advocate that Americans be taught religious morals. However, this
objection is framed in a neutrality-obsessed mindset, and as Ragosta
notes: “He was certainly emphatic that government should neither
encourage nor endorse religion, but he never sought to purge religion
… from the public sphere.10” Jefferson was concerned with the
mixing of religious and secular power structures. He had no issue
with those in the government and the populace being religious, since
religion could instill virtues needed to preserve the republic. Such
principles were enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution.
The idea of separation between church and state achieved its first
constitutional expression in the First Amendment, which was
carefully designed to keep the federal government from establishing
religion but also from impeding free exercise of religion so as to
preserve the purity of both the church and the state. As Michael
Sandel notes: “The religious interest served by separation is in
avoiding the corruption that comes with dependence on civil
authority,” while “the political interest served by separation is in
avoiding the civil strife that has historically attended church-state

8

Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 39.
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University of Virginia Press, 2013), 170.
9

27

XJUR Vol. 4 (2016)
entanglements.11” A series of interests competed in the formation of
the First Amendment, since the issue of how the federal government
interacted with religion would have serious consequences for both
those states that had established churches and the project of religious
pluralism. In the end, the First Amendment was formed by a
compromise that confined its effects to the federal government:
As previously shown, the First Amendment “compromise”
was between those who wanted to prevent the federal
government from interfering with state establishments, but
were more than happy to restrict federal authority severely;
those who wanted to keep a distant federal government out
of people’s lives, and supporters of Jefferson and Madison
who wanted to prevent government interference in religion
(sometimes overlapping groups).12
This view of church-state separation, where the federal government
takes a laissez-faire approach to religion and the states are left more
or less free to handle religion however they like, persisted until the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. During that time, oddly
enough, the states revoked the official status of their established
religions.13 Despite this erosion, Americans remained very religious,
enough so that Alexis de Tocqueville took serious note. Tocqueville’s
1835 edition of Democracy in America was written in two volumes:
one devoted to American politics, the other to American civic
institutions. However, Tocqueville actually planned three volumes:
the first two as they appeared, and a third on religion in America. 14
American religion continued to inculcate moral values for citizenship,
and Americans themselves were very proud of both their religion and
11

Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1996), 61, 62.
12
Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” 182.
13
Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim
Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 110.
14
James T. Schleifer, “Tocqueville, Religion, and Democracy in America:
Some Essential Questions,” American Political Thought 3, no. 2 (Fall 2014):
254–255.
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their church-state separation.15 During this period and throughout the
nineteenth century, church influence in politics steadily waned, but
the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution, particularly the
Fourteenth Amendment, made the federal government and courts
more involved in American religion.
The Fourteenth Amendment was born of a recognition that the Bill of
Rights provided for certain rights that may have been protected by the
federal government, but not state governments. As a result, the
Amendment was written in such a way that the courts interpreted it to
extend the protections of the Bill of Rights to individuals when state
law did not provide those protections.16 This move placed the federal
government in a position to enforce a whole host of liberties,
including religious liberty through neutral separation of church and
state. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized churchstate separation, previously only a principle in the American mind.
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent judicial rulings
began a time of further decrease in church influence in the state.
Eventually, the Amendment and the rulings established the principle
of aggressive neutrality between church and state. According to
Michael Sandel, this system of neutrality finally triumphed in 1947,
and it has persisted since. This system is problematic, as it coincides
with the liberal value of the person as a freely choosing self.17 Under
such a conception, all religious activities and beliefs ought to be the
result of a free choice by an individual, and there is no room for
beliefs or activities undertaken through duty. Thus, because all
religious activities must be the result of a free choice by an individual,
government must ensure complete neutrality between church and
state.

15

Ibid., 257, 258.
Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim
Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 111.
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Now we can see the development of neutrality-obsessed separation,
which represents a significant departure from the separation in early
America. In early America, religion was a valuable institution for the
formation of citizens and political leaders. It inculcated moral duties
and principles and provided a restraint for excessive political
passions. Now, as Reichley writes, the situation has changed: “In
more recent times some Americans have come to regard religion as a
kind of consumer value, like sports or travel, that should be available
in a pluralist society but that makes no essential contribution to the
moral foundation of democracy.18” The role of religion as a
contributor to the “good objects of society” has eroded, and secular
value systems have failed to fill religion’s old role. Yet, there are still
many who feel a longing for a restored role of religion in America,
and they have taken action towards that end. So, we arrive at the
current state of dysfunctional tension in church-state separation in
America: a missing part of the formation of citizens coupled with a
tension between a conservative movement that seeks to restore
religion’s old role and other interests that seek to preserve the status
quo.
II. The Compromised State of Neutrality-Obsessed Church-State
Separation
In the present day, the liberal effort of the last sixty to seventy years
to enact neutrality-obsessed church-state separation now faces mixed
results. In one sense, America’s sacred public centers are no longer
religious, but civil. American public life is more and more focused
around malls and other commercial venues, sports stadiums, and
offices as opposed to churches. This preference for the civil can be
seen in the fact that Al-Qaeda chose to attack symbols of American
capitalism and consumerism, American politics, and American
militarism as opposed to any targets with religious symbolism on
September 11, 2001.19 In addition, the Supreme Court has regularly
held that government must be neutral towards religion and vice versa
18

Reichley, Religion in American Public Life, 340.
Philip Gorski, “Religious Pluralism and Democratic Inclusion: The
American Recipe for Peace,” Society 51, no. 6 (December 2014): 632.
19
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in order to protect the free choices of individuals with regards to their
religious beliefs. Such neutrality-obsessed separation has rarely been
questioned judicially.20 Beyond the judicial realm, Jefferson’s idea of
a wall of separation between church and state construed as complete
neutrality now has a firm presence in the American consciousness, a
victory for the current form of separation.
At the same time, liberal neutrality-obsessed separation has left the
ability of American politics, law, and society to deal with matters of
religion significantly wounded. This principle is nowhere more
apparent than in the conflict between liberal neutral separation, which
hinges on the freely choosing self, and the sense that many Americans
still have of religious duty and obligation. These citizens do not hold
their beliefs or behave as a result of completely free choice, and so a
neutrality-obsessed government and court system will find it hard to
ensure religious liberty for these Americans.21 The presence of
difficulty in securing a basic liberty for citizens who feel bound by
religious duty is a very serious problem, and it shows a flaw in
current church-state separation, but it is not the only one. A new and
ongoing conservative movement seeks to place religion in a public
role similar to (or even greater than) the one it had in the early
republic. This movement is commonly known as the Religious Right,
and it poses a direct challenge to the very existence of neutralityobsessed separation, or possibly any form of separation.
The greatest test of, or rather challenge to, modern neutralityobsessed church-state separation began in the 1980s when a period of
awakening brought religion and religious ideals back to the public
sphere after they had been somewhat bracketed in the preceding
decades. Evangelical Protestants drove this new period of awakening,
in a reversal of their previous stance towards the issue. Prior to the
1950s, evangelicals largely supported church-state separation, but that
support withered in the 1950s through the 1970s as a reaction to
events ranging from the 1954 Brown case to the election of John F.
20

Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy, 58–59, 63.
21
Ibid., 65.
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Kennedy and an assortment of school prayer and Bible study
Supreme Court cases in the decades leading up to the 1980s.22
Dissatisfied with the moral state of the country and its politics,
evangelicals and others began to assert their consciences in American
politics and culture, including through the political activities of
ministers like Pat Robertson.23 This new political and religious
movement, which persists to this day, came to be known as the
Religious Right.
By the time of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, this revivalist project
thrived and has continued to do so since. At the core of this
movement is the belief that the law of God should be enacted in
America, and that believers ought to unleash their full arsenal of
political tools to realize this vision.24 As the epilogue of his book
Clear and Present Danger: Church and State in Post-Christian
America, author William Stanmeyer writes “A Letter to a Christian
Citizen,” virtually a manifesto of the new revivalism. Stanmeyer
expresses the new revivalist dedication so clearly (and, in his
fundamentalist devotion, so alarmingly), that he is worth quoting at
length:
Like an army sitting still, we become an easy target. If we do
nothing about the economic, political, and legal rules that
structure our public life and much of our private lives, we
abandon those rules by default to the manipulation of people
who have a theological agenda and a social vision hostile to
our faith. We can no more stand aloof, above the fray, when
“good” or “bad” laws are made than we could walk by on
the other side of the road when we come upon a traveler
beaten, robbed, and left half-dead in the ditch. We are called
to intervene.25

22

Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” 181.
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Of particular note in this passage is the metaphor Stanmeyer uses of
America as a mauled traveler, drawn from the parable of the Good
Samaritan. For Stanmeyer and other new revivalists, asserting
religious beliefs in politics is about aiding an ailing entity. To them, it
is a benevolent thing to do, but in fact their fundamentalist devotion
to their beliefs poses a direct threat to both neutrality-obsessed
church-state separation and democracy as a whole.26
Yet, despite the problems posed by this ideology, it has had a
significant impact on American politics. Those of religious conviction
dominated (and still dominate) the pro-life movement and similar
social movements.27 Court cases involving religious liberty, prayer in
schools, religious expression in public spaces and institutions, and
questions of the scope of both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment are a frequent occurrence and they
garner a great deal of public attention.28 Most alarmingly of all, the
past twenty years have seen an expansion of legislative moves at the
state level to bypass the federal government and the stricter neutrality
practices there in order to enact laws friendlier to religion. Between
1995 and 2009, various state legislatures around the country passed
87 different laws along these lines.29 These laws are varied in both
language and effects, but they nonetheless challenge the idea of a
government whose role is limited with regards to religion.

26

Robert Brathwaite and Andrew Bramsen, “Reconceptualizing Church and
State: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Separation of
Religion and State on Democracy,” Politics & Religion 4, no. 2 (August
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Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” 169.
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So it can be seen that the movement represented primarily by the
Religious Right represents a significant breach in neutrality-obsessed
church-state separation and presents that separation with its greatest
challenge to date. The pervading church-state separation and the new
revivalism are at an impasse. Both ideologies are opposed in such a
way that they cannot seem to be able to agree on the proper
relationship of religion to the state and culture.
Yet, it is absolutely necessary to find a proper balanced relationship
between church and state. The Founders correctly believed that
religion could contribute to the formation of morals necessary in a
good citizen. Indeed, in a time hostile to tradition, when these values
that reinforce democracy can no longer rely on custom to persist,
religion is more important than ever in its role as their incubator. 30 In
addition, there is no dismissing the power of religion in world affairs,
and attempts to build the good society using purely secular means
have been no more successful than attempts to do so using religious
means. Religion, simply put, is here to stay, and it is a force that must
be accounted for.31
At the same time, government still must take caution in regards to
religion, since there are dangers that come with giving religion too
much power in society. Certain aspects of religion, especially their
tendencies to make absolute truth claims, can be antithetical to
democracy. These aspects are resistant to the democratic mindset,
where consensus and compromise is key to successful governing, and
it is virtually impossible to realize one’s full agenda.32
Thus, we are left with a complex paradox that defies easy resolution.
On the one hand, religion is crucial as an incubator for values and
institutions that form the backbone of a democratic society, so it must
be given at least some room. On the other hand, religion possesses the
30

Reichley, Religion in American Public Life, 348; Thomas G. Walsh,
“Religion, Peace, and the Post-Secular Public Sphere,” International Journal
on World Peace 29, no. 2 (June 2012): 44.
31
Walsh, “Religion, Peace, and the Post-Secular Public Sphere,” 35–36, 59.
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tendency to run wild in ways that could do more harm than good, so
we must take care to check its power. Trying to balance these ideas
with a greater emphasis on checking religion’s power has produced
mixed results, so a new balance is needed.
III. The Case for Greater Deference to Free Religious Exercise
We have now demonstrated that contemporary neutrality-obsessed
church-state separation is a flawed system, and while it may have a
future, it does not deserve one. Therefore, we are left with the task of
outlining a more effective way to construct our church-state
separation. In doing so, we are presented with the challenge of
properly balancing the duality of principles at the center of any
church-state arrangement.
The question at the core of the quest for an effective church-state
separation is one enshrined in the two clauses of the First Amendment
that pertain to religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. These two clauses reference two warring principles:
democratic inclusion through the prevention of any governmental
religious establishment and protection for religious exercise as well as
the expression of religiously informed consciences through the Free
Exercise Clause. These principles, when applied without restraint, are
mutually exclusive. If an emphasis is placed only on democratic
inclusion, then religious expression in both consciences and policy
must be suppressed and kept out of any public processes to avoid
exclusion. In a similar way, complete freedom of religious conscience
facilitates the creation of policies and court rulings that clearly favor a
specific belief set, thereby excluding entire sets of religious beliefs
and morals, a practice neither desirable nor practical in a multicultural
democratic society such as ours.
Forming any relationship between church and state involves striking a
balance between these two principles, and an optimal balance leans
slightly in favor of religious conscience so that religion can be used to
inculcate moral virtues that are beneficial to democracy while
maintaining checks on religious conscience to allow government to
function and prevent the establishment of a theocracy. However, even
35
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once such a relationship is established, it must be constantly
reevaluated, as the freedom of religious expression can produce new
variants of religions, and democratic inclusion changes with
conceptions of citizenship.33 The final part of this paper will argue
that giving greater favor to the freedom of religious exercise and
religious conscience is a reliable solution for the current problems
with church-state separation, but it is not to be taken as a permanent
solution.
The current liberal form of neutrality-obsessed church-state
separation, to its detriment, places great emphasis on democratic
inclusion as opposed to expression of religious conscience. This
emphasis is based on the worry that giving religious conscience too
much power in the state can work against democratic principles. Such
a worry is not unfounded, since most of the world’s religions tend to
make absolute truth claims along with claims that any other contrary
doctrines from any other religious traditions are absolutely false. This
viewpoint is antithetical to democracy in principle because
democratic governing takes place as a result of deliberation and
compromise; activities rendered irrelevant in the presence of absolute
truth claims.34 The threat of this viewpoint is very real, as evidenced
by the stances, actions, and popularity of the Religious Right, which
seeks to make government legislation reflect Biblical moral teachings.
In response to this threat, neutrality-obsessed separation greatly
favors protecting democratic inclusion by seeking to keep religion
and religious conviction bracketed from public life. However, even if
this move was justified in creating an effective church-state
separation, it fails to keep religion out of politics and public life.
(Indeed, Gorski goes so far as to credit the emergence of the

33
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Religious Right to the prevalence of neutrality-obsessed separation.35)
Since the role of a legislator is to represent a constituency and the
viewpoints of those constituents, legislators from areas where the
Religious Right has a strong presence can actually gain electoral
benefits by bringing issues of church and state to the fore of
legislative activity. Beyond the constituency scale, many recent
Republican presidential candidates have had to cater to the Religious
Right, since conservative evangelicals form a significant contingent
of Republican primary voters that candidates need to win over for the
Party’s nomination.36
Further, neutrality-obsessed separation, by seeking to bracket religion
from public life, stifles the good elements of religion for democracy
by taking away key components of religious practice, leaving
American religion too compromised to effectively perform its role as
a moral incubator. Privatized American religion as it is now treated
separates from its uses of ritual, place, and doctrine, elements that
possess significant public and social aspects and are normally
considered essential to a religion’s character.37 As for the beneficial
role religion can play, Jefferson and many others saw it as a potent
force for inculcating and sustaining moral virtue in citizens. Jefferson
and Madison wanted a secular government with church-state
separation, but they also clearly wanted a religiously engaged
citizenry and government where religious convictions were common
and frequently expressed.38 The difficulty we encounter is that many
35
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of the moral virtues that Jefferson and Madison believed religion
could cultivate and maintain are based in doctrine or tradition of some
other form, elements that are now compromised in American religion,
primarily due to its bracketing by neutrality-obsessed separation.
It seems obvious, after tracing all of the faults in American religion as
the result of a church-state separation that places a great emphasis on
protecting democratic inclusion, that the metaphorical scales are in
fact out of balance, and that they must be shifted to give slightly more
favor to protecting religious conscience and religious exercise.
Beyond simply attempting to alleviate some current problems
American church-state separation faces, there are also other practical
reasons for such a shift. First, American religion is becoming an
increasingly decentralized and varied phenomenon. The advent of socalled “New Age” spiritualities and individual spiritualities has
introduced a great deal of subjectivity into American religion
combined with an increasing distaste for established religions, leading
to the point that American citizens now hold a plethora of different
religious beliefs. Moreover, some of these beliefs are radically
different from the Christianity that was historically prevalent in the
country.39
As the spectrum of American religion morphs and comes to
encompass non-traditional belief systems, the number of de facto
religious minorities in America grows. These minorities can be quite
small, so small that they might be left out of the representative system
or ostracized for what might be deemed bizarre or dangerous beliefs.
Thus, the potential for exclusion from the democratic process grows
with the decentralization of American religion, and so the government
is obligated to intervene in some way, probably by becoming more
accommodating to religious conscience. This ultimately means that
free religious exercise may occasionally require government
support,40 an egregious violation of neutrality-obsessed separation,
but a necessary one if the state chooses to continue its rightful
practice of ensuring equal participation in the democratic system.
39
40
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Second, free religious exercise in principle requires that citizens be
able to act on their religious consciences in arenas of public life. As
stated before, religion exerts a powerful influence on beliefs and
morals, in some cases being the primary or even sole influence in
their formation. Citizens whose beliefs have been informed by a
religious tradition often take these beliefs very seriously, therefore to
bracket such beliefs or morals by virtue of their being based in
religion is an act of exclusion against those who consciences were
formed in a strongly religious context. As this paper has emphasized
repeatedly, religious conscience must be checked, but pure neutralityobsessed separation has no such check, preferring to simply bracket
religious conscience from public life. Free religious exercise simply
cannot be protected when religious conscience is completely
bracketed.
What this paper has laid out is the need for a shift of emphasis and a
rethinking of the way the United States conducts and conceives of its
church-state separation. The liberal neutrality-obsessed separation
born of American policy and jurisprudence since the end of World
War II simply cannot stand, since it leaves American religion
bracketed and too compromised to be of benefit. Religion, a potent
force for the inculcation and preservation of first principles and civic
virtues, is almost unable to perform this purpose because religious
conscience and religion itself has been bracketed from American life
and broken down, losing some of its crucial characteristics. What is
needed is a fundamental shift in jurisprudence and government policy
that will give more deference to religious conscience, but not to too
great an extent. Such a shift will allow religious conscience and
religious influence to return to the public sphere, where it can
continue to work towards the purpose that Jefferson and many of the
Founding Fathers wanted it to fulfill. While the circumstances in
which Jefferson and the Founding Fathers thought about religion are
long gone, their principles may still very well provide one of the best
frameworks for church and state today.
To be sure, a shift in values pertaining to American religion is a
change that possesses a cultural facet as well as a governmental one,
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rendering such a shift a difficult and likely time-consuming process.
The processes that built neutrality-obsessed separation took decades,
if not centuries, to unfold, and so it is realistic to expect their reversal
to take at least as long. However, it is apparent after analyzing the
flaws of neutrality-obsessed separation that such a change must occur,
regardless of the time spent enacting it. At the same time, this change
has many variables, and so the details are far too complex for a paper
like this. Such questions will be debated by, researched, and argued
over by policy experts, lawmakers, and judges for decades to come.
Nevertheless, this shift is possible, but it remains important to keep in
mind that the outline of a solution this paper proposes, while it is a
good one that can work to fix many of neutrality-obsessed churchstate separation’s problems, cannot be expected to permanently solve
the issue of church and state. The history of this relationship is a long
and complex one, and if it possessed an easy solution, that solution
would likely have been found by now. Due to the representative
nature of politics and the myriad of public opinions concerning
religion in the electorate, we can expect to see issues of religion come
up repeatedly in the political process, since legislators and
administrators representing these various beliefs about religion are
bound to emerge over time. So, for the foreseeable future, the debate
over church-state separation will continue as it has for centuries, if
not millennia, with the scales holding the two competing principles of
democratic inclusion and freedom of religious exercise and
conscience moving back and forth. However, if American democracy
hopes to collect the benefits from a religious citizenry while
preserving the positive aspects of her democracy, the scales must tilt
slightly more in favor of freedom of religious conscience in the end.
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